Users need the outcome they authorized
A wallet or app should be able to sign constraints and receive the state-machine outcome those constraints allow, not a hidden route, silent fallback, or degraded fill.
Fair Outcomes gives wallets and apps a bounded Fair DeFi path: transactions are admitted and ordered by validator-client rules, then settled by on-chain intent, offer, account-closure, and report checks instead of hidden order or route control.
Fair Outcomes is not a faster private relay or a promise to remove every trading advantage. It is a bounded Fair DeFi design where fair order and fair settlement are both checked by public protocol rules.
A wallet or app should be able to sign constraints and receive the state-machine outcome those constraints allow, not a hidden route, silent fallback, or degraded fill.
Swaps, liquidations, auctions, and downstream DeFi actions need declared account sets, compute bounds, CPI limits, and atomicity modes before fair ordering begins.
The protocol design pays for admission, reveal, Fair Proof Bundle availability, replay, and proof-valid settlement instead of letting participants buy position inside the fair batch.
Modern transaction supply chains route sensitive DeFi flow through RPC peering, private relays, bundle systems, priority fees, aggregators, RFQ venues, and PropAMMs. Those systems improve landing and liquidity, but they also create hidden points where order, route, inclusion, quote quality, and settlement semantics can be exploited.
Validators and transaction supply-chain actors can monetize sequencing when profitable trades, oracle updates, liquidations, or swaps depend on relative position.
Private paths can improve landing reliability, but they also normalize privileged blockspace access and often give searchers stronger atomicity than ordinary users receive.
A user can approve one economic result and settle another when quotes, routes, solver choices, account sets, fees, rebates, or downstream calls are not binding on-chain.
Fair Outcomes connects wallet intent, ingress evidence, validator ordering, runtime fences, on-chain settlement, account-set closure, Fair Proof Bundles, and economics into one auditable protocol.
Gateways and witnesses issue signed receipts for transaction commitments, propagation policy, cutoff time, and fair-domain routing.
A native pre-transaction envelope path admits, commits, orders, reveals, validates, fences, schedules, executes, and proves fair-domain batches.
Users sign intents, venues and solvers submit binding offers, and settlement programs verify candidate universes, fills, fees, rebates, refunds, and reports.
The MVP starts with native single-transaction settlement, explicit runtime bounds, quote bonds, fair-work rewards, and replay-verifiable launch gates.
The fair envelope is a pre-transaction object. The validator commits admission before randomness, reveals payloads after order commitment, validates the inner transaction, fences protected accounts, schedules conflicting transactions by dependency graph, and requires settlement claims to fit declared bounds.
The paper includes a formal specification and bounded model checking under ideal cryptographic assumptions, plus Fair DeFi safety invariants for deterministic settlement, account fences, quote integrity, Fair Proof Bundle availability, and atomic composability.
Earlier committed conflicting transactions must complete or fail before later conflicting transactions execute.
Protected fair-domain accounts cannot be touched by ordinary traffic around a fair batch unless the domain's deterministic exception rules allow it.
Min output, approved venues, expiry, fees, downstream programs, and fail-closed policy are enforced by the settlement program.
Single-intent fills and batch clearing must select or reject offers by public rules, not by private arrival order or solver discretion.
A firm committed quote that falls below promised terms fails or produces attributable bond and refund consequences.
The selected settlement mode defines whether the work settles in one transaction, a fair atomic sequence, or staged escrow with deterministic rollback paths.
Proof roots are not enough; replay and certification depend on reconstructable Fair Proof Bundle data.
Aggregators, makers, and solvers may propose candidates, but the chain verifies the selected result before it can settle as FairDeFiSettled.
The market design replaces private-orderflow revenue with fair-work rewards. Validators earn for proof-valid slots, witnesses earn for receipts, committees earn for reveal work, venues price and bond quote risk, and solvers compete to improve user outcomes rather than extract from order or settlement control.
The full paper covers protocol objects, validator-client architecture, replay validity, committee design, fair/normal account fencing, account-set closure, atomicity modes, Fair Proof Bundle finality, Fair DeFi settlement, economic equilibrium, launch gates, and the deployment plan.
No. It targets specific extractive mechanisms inside certified fair domains: content-based reordering, private fair-domain bundles, normal-lane bypass, unjustified exclusion, hidden route changes, quote degradation, and settlement outside user constraints. It does not eliminate public arbitrage, market making, inventory-risk compensation, or off-chain latency advantage.
It means the binding parts of a fair trade are verified by the state machine: user authorization, candidate universe, selected offer or clearing rule, settlement transfers, fees, rebates, refunds, bond consequences, execution report, and declared downstream DeFi composition. Off-chain systems can still discover prices and propose routes.
Yes. The complete design assumes a native validator-client implementation plus Fair DeFi programs for intents, offers, settlement, reports, bonds, account-set closure, and mode-specific replay checks.
Yes. Wallets can expose guaranteed, balanced, and fast execution modes. The important rule is that fallback from fair execution to normal or private routing must be explicit and signed, not silent.
Fair fees pay for admission capacity and proof work rather than rank. Validators are compensated for verifiable fair behavior, venues price and bond quote risk explicitly, users can receive deterministic refund paths, and solvers are redirected into public surplus creation.